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Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality, by David Baggett and Jerry
L. Walls. Oxford University Press, 2011. 283 pages. $99.00 (cloth), $24.95
(paper).
DAVID O’HARA, Augustana College
David Baggett and Jerry Walls announce that this is to be both an academic book and one intended for a general audience, and that its aims
will be to show that moral considerations lead us to believe in God, and
to defend a certain kind of theistic worldview and theistic ethics. On the
whole, it’s a good book, and I recommend it.
The authors are Anselmians and Arminians, and they have strong sympathies with C. S. Lewis, Plantinga and the later MacIntyre. They believe in
divine command theory of a sort that avoids the problems of Ockhamistic
voluntarism by identifying God with the good. They hold that morality
points to God, and that God makes sense of morality. Their hope is to defend these views and so to move us beyond the question of whether or not
God exists to the issue of how to become personally more acquainted with
the character and goodness of God. “Morality, ultimately, for the Christian,
is all about relationship, first and foremost with God, and then secondarily
with others” (186).
These are big things to write about with both clarity and precision for
a general audience. Bearing that in mind, the biggest flaw in the book
is quite understandable: the tone and accessibility of the book is not
consistent. Their voice changes, and often they write in the language of
the guild, shifting away from the kind of lucidity that otherwise would
appeal to a general audience. Also, at first blush, some of the problems
they address may not be appealing to a general audience. For instance,
one chapter is dedicated to advancing their version of Arminianism over
against other Reformed views. They write that “both Calvin and Luther
wished to say that God’s will trumps. This was a crucial mistake because
philosophically it’s indefensible” (75). For some readers, that kind of claim
and its defense will no doubt be extremely interesting, and it does serve
the aims of the book by helping to explain their view of God’s goodness.
But this chapter may seem irrelevant or even distasteful to those outside
the Calvin/Arminius debate, as when they open the condescending rhetorical spigots for sentences like these: “Calvinists insist on defining sovereignty as all-encompassing divine determinism; anything less than his
micromanagerial and meticulous providence is unworthy of the greatness
of his sovereign power. . . .Loving God with all of one’s mind demands a
more credible theology than Calvinism can offer” (78–79).
Still, a slower reading shows that it is often the case that they accomplish broad goals while intending to attack narrow problems. This apparently narrow Calvin/Arminius debate serves the more general purpose
of arguing that philosophy does indeed have a role to play in thinking
about the goodness of God. There is also a second benefit to this debate:
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their discussion of the philosophical problems of compatibilism may be
directed towards Calvinists, but they subtly suggest that it applies equally
to those naturalists who, as compatibilists, see no problem with affirming
both materialist determinism and freedom, or to those who attempt to
resolve the problem by hand-waving and misdirecting euphemisms.
Baggett and Walls often prove to be broad and generous readers of their
adversaries. For example, Dawkins claims that the God of the Bible commits and commands so many atrocities that God cannot be morally good.
Baggett and Walls respond with sympathy: Dawkins, they urge, correctly
perceives that “character is key.” His error lies not in his first principles,
but in his method: he misunderstands the character of God by poor sampling of the data, “as if a perusal of the periphery yields more insight than
an examination of the core” of God’s character. The issue is not acquiescence to an existential proposition but the work of gaining familiarity
with that which exists: “If God is real, then we must strive not for mere
propositional knowledge or justified belief that God exists but a personal
acquaintance with the God who does exist” (50).
And there is the crux of the book. The whole book is a modern attempt
to solve a version of the Euthyphro problem. The solution is not found
merely theoretically, at the periphery. Rather, by coming to know God,
and what God is like, we will come to see its solution. Knowledge of God
will mean knowing the basis on which moral obligations rest. Baggett and
Walls insist that we need to know more than the social dimension of moral
obligations, that in addition to epistemic understanding of the social function of the good we need an ontological understanding of it as well. That
ontological knowledge boils down (at the risk of oversimplifying) to the
identity of God and of the good, so that “God is good” is both predication and identity (126). So the two aims of the book (defending theistic
ethics and showing that moral considerations lead to theism) are difficult
to separate from one another. Their view is that because God is identical with the good, God cannot command us to do what is not good. This
overcomes the “Ockhamistic” (read: voluntaristic) problem that may be
entailed by divine command theory.
Of course, there are still problems with this view. They attempt to
clarify their position by insisting that “what God can’t do is anything in
diametric opposition, irremediable tension, or patent conflict with our
most nonnegotiable moral commitments.” That sounds strong, but I don’t
think it solves more problems than it creates. If we were attempting to get
away from postmodern moral relativism by appealing to God, this seems
to make our moral imagination a limit on God’s action and identity. But it
is not clear how such an appeal to our moral sentiments avoids the postmodern problem. They answer that “philosophers from Aristotle to Kant
have recognized that a certain vagueness in ethics is unavoidable” (135).
The test of ethical plausibility then seems to be whether or not one “can
imagine a conjunction of divine perfection [and a given moral command]”
(136). Okay, then why posit that vagueness or imaginability here, rather
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than at an earlier junction, like when engaging in moral reasoning prior to
doing theology? Why not prefer a more pragmatic or phenomenological
ethic and skip some of these problems that seem like a significant distraction from getting down to the business of doing the good rather than
disputing about the ontology of the good?
Perhaps the strongest answer to this question comes in chapter 8, one
of their most solid and interesting chapters. There the authors go to bat
against “unfriendly atheism,” i.e., the view that belief in God is not permissible because such belief is irrational. Baggett and Walls are not merely
exploring a possible view about ethics; they are defending the right to
believe. Or, as they put it in chapter 9, “The right ultimate view of reality
is plausibly the one that will be most likely to produce the right analysis of
the relationship between morality and rationality” (172). In other words,
the right view of God will lead to a world that makes sense.
The authors hold that naturalism necessarily leads to determinism. On
the one hand, I’m inclined to agree that this seems the likeliest possibility,
but I also note that many naturalists insist that it simply ain’t so. Some naturalists, like Peirce and Bergson, suggest that the conditions of spiritual
freedom might arise out of nature. But I think that Baggett and Walls have
in mind in particular naturalists like Dennett, whose case for an emergent
freedom often seems to amount to something like a case for merely apparent freedom. That case boils down to a wallpapered version of Crick’s
“astonishing hypothesis,” in which we are all “just a pack of neurons”
whose function is to invent clever little words like “freedom” and then
to act like we believe these clever little words. If, as I think, Baggett and
Walls are really concerned with these latter sorts of naturalists, then not
only do Baggett and Walls appear to be right, but it becomes clear that
their concern in this book is not merely epistemic. What’s really at stake
here is nothing short of everything. As they point out in chapter 4, “If God
exists, he’s not just one more item in the inventory of reality, but the key to
understanding the whole” (80).
And this is one of the great strengths of the book. It is not merely a
book about the theory of ethics. It’s really a book about everything, and
its authors seem motivated by the idea that everything in fact matters. As
a pragmatist, I can’t say that I can prove them right, but I can say that I
prefer the consequences of their belief to many of its alternatives.
Despite my appreciation for their position, I am not convinced they are
completely fair to some of their philosophical opponents. In the first chapter, for instance, they critique a straw man who bears a lot of resemblance
to Sartre, but not enough to be convincing. While it is true that Sartre is
deeply skeptical about finding transcendent “values or commands to
legitimize our conduct,” that does not leave him in the position of
endorsing all conduct whatsoever, nor does it leave the Sartrean in the
position of the immoralist. Sartre’s critique of transcendence is not simply
aimed at undermining ethics but at underscoring human moral freedom
and moral responsibility, and at drawing attention to the importance of
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intersubjectivity (and so of the people we encounter) over against the
potentially idolatrous worship of moral abstractions. Abstractions can become fierce gods, and they sometimes demand human sacrifice. In this
and later chapters, their construals of the positions of Plato and Ockham
are similarly subject to criticism. Still, I think we can cut Baggett and Walls
a good deal of slack. They are not arguing against Ockham the man, but
against a view they have identified as Ockhamism, and if they have failed
to include in this criticism all possible versions of Ockhamism, their criticisms of this version are keen and instructive. The same goes for their presentation of the Euthyphro problem. Those of us who spend our lives in
Plato’s texts might not recognize their explanation of the problem from the
eponymous dialogue, but we can nevertheless look at the problem they do
address with admiration of their philosophical insight and rigor. To their
credit, they make a small nod in the direction of Sartrean intersubjectivity
in chapter 5 when putting (a little) distance between themselves and the
moral arguments of William Lane Craig (100).
This book has a clear aim, and a clear trajectory, and watching Baggett
and Walls follow that trajectory is instructive and rewarding. While I am
not certain that they succeed in making their argument as simple or as accessible as they had hoped, the book has the great strength of giving us a
fresh and serious look at a topic that might matter more than anything else.

The Poetics of Evil: Towards an Aesthetic Theodicy, by Philip Tallon. Oxford
University Press, 2012. xx + 251 pages. $74.00 (hardcover).
David Brown, The Divinity School, University of St. Andrews
As the title of his book indicates, Tallon seeks to restore an aesthetic dimension in Christian approaches to the problem of evil. However, rather
than placing them alongside moral considerations where the aesthetic
inevitably comes a poor second, he suggests that it be thought more in
terms of Eleonore Stump’s second person perspective, insights that can
enrich the believing Christian’s understanding of the nature of the divine
creation. To that end, Tallon’s discussion proceeds by three stages, taking
in turn the traditional harmony argument (with good balancing evil) and
then the issue of tragedy before turning finally to more recent discussions
of “horrors.”
Tallon’s interest in the first issue appears to have taken its rise from dissatisfaction with Barth’s familiar remark that the music of Mozart enabled
him to hear “the whole context of providence.” The balance of light and
shade emerges, Tallon suggests, much more clearly in many another composer, and indeed Irenaeus’s more dynamic, symphonic understanding is
better than Augustine’s essentially static picture. Yet it is Augustine who
is defended at length from a number of critiques, including the claim of

